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MARRIAGE AND WORK:   
AN ANALYSIS FOR FRENCH COUPLES IN THE LAST DECADE♣
 
ELENA G. F.  STANCANELLI 







This paper investigates the occurrence of couple households where the wife is the main or sole earner. 
There is huge economic literature on lone parents but, to our knowledge, no economic paper deals 
with the situation of female breadwinners in couple households.  This issue is relevant for policy 
purposes.  We find that in one every six couple-households the wife was the sole or the main earner in 
France in year 2002.   It is the purpose of our study to shed some light on these phenomena.  We 
provide some descriptive and exploratory analysis of the determinants of the labour market states of 
spouses, accounting for positive assortative mating as well as for changing macroeconomic 
conditions.  We find that, on one hand, female breadwinners and wife-higher-earnings couples are 
significantly more likely to occur when both spouses are low-educated, but, on the other hand, the 
probability of wife-higher-earnings is also significantly higher for the highest educated. This suggests 
some dichotomization of wives that earn more than their husbands: they are either low-educated 
women with a low-educated husband or high-educated women.  On the other hand, female 
breadwinners are predominantly low-educated women.  
  
Keywords : Marriage, work behaviour, household economics. 
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1.  Introduction  
The number of dual-earners has been steadily increasing over time in OECD countries.  It 
was, for example, equal to 50% of married couples in Australia in 2001 and 59% in the USA 
in the same year (Drago et al., 2004, Bureau of Labor, 2004).  According to our estimates, 
over 57% of couples, whether married or not, were dual-earners in France in 2001 -this figure 
has increased from less than 52% in 1990.  About 24% of American dual-earners wives 
earned more than their husband (Bureau of Labor, 2004).  The number of female 
breadwinners was quite remarkable also in Australia at about the same time (Drago et al., 
2004).  The proportion of wives earning more than their husband among French dual-earners 
was 22%, according to our estimates.   
There is no economic literature on female breadwinners.  There is huge literature on lone 
parents but, to our knowledge, no economic paper deals with the situation of female 
breadwinners in couple-households.  Only non-economists have looked into this issue.  In the 
United States, two popular best-sellers investigate the occurrence of female breadwinners.  
Minetor (2002), a female-breadwinner herself, carries out a series of interviews with a number 
of American female breadwinners and their husbands.  The author draws her sample by 
contacting associations of female managers and career women in the United States.  Her book 
suggests that sometimes female-breadwinner households are just due to the hazard but other 
times they come out from a deliberate choice of the two spouses to let the wife make her 
career first.  In this last case, the husbands interviewed are often stay home men, happy to 
care for their children, while in other cases they are unemployed people unsuccessful at 
finding a job. A similar methodological approach, based on a series of interviews with female 
breadwinners and their husbands, is taken by Pappenheim and Graves (2005) that draw their 
sample using personal contacts and words of mouth.  The female breadwinners pictured in 
their book are often top career women whose husband’s business failed.  Both books find a 
great deal of stress and conflict between spouses in female-breadwinner households, which 
arises, at least partly, from the lack of recognition by society of the existence of households 
like theirs, as the stereotype remains that of men being the sole or the main earner.  Some of 
the households interviewed, for example, do not talk about their situation with neighbours and 
relatives as they feel they would be dispraised.  Unhappy female breadwinners feel resentful 
to their husbands for not having taken a conventional male breadwinner role and unhappy 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
  3 husbands make low job search efforts.  To sum up, the happiest female-breadwinner couples 
look like those where female breadwinnership was chosen by the spouses.   
The subject of female breadwinnership has been brought up by psychologists and 
sociologists.  Drago et al. (2004) look at the existence and persistence of situations of female 
breadwinnership in Australia, using data drawn from a panel dataset.  The authors conclude 
that when the wives’ earning dominance arises from economic factors, husbands tend to have 
low socio-economic status, a poor labour market position and low family commitment; when 
it is associated with gender equity principles of spouses, spouses’ characteristics are more 
often positive.  Brennan et al. (2001) draw a "representative" sample of female-breadwinner 
couples to investigate the impact of earnings dominance on the quality of spouses' marital 
role.  They conclude that there is no impact of changes in wives’ earnings on marital role 
quality, but they find that the reverse is true for men.  However, their sample is quite small 
and the response rate my not be independent of marriage quality.  
From the point of view of economists, the policy implications of female breadwinnership 
may be more relevant than the happiness of spouses.  Most OECD countries have developed 
policies to increase the participation rates of women in an attempt to limit the size of the 
pension burden and to deal with the aging population. While single women tend to have 
similar labour market participation rates than men, married women have much lower 
participation rates in all OECD countries (see, for example, OECD, 2001).  Considerable 
attention has been paid to the design of new policies that may encourage work by married 
women and remove obstacles to the labour market participation of "mothers". The literature 
shows, for example, that joint taxation and tax credits discourage labour market participation 
of secondary earners (Apps, 2006, Apps and Rees, 2005, Stancanelli, 2004).  Husbands might 
be affected by these possible distortionary incentives too, especially in the cases under study 
here.  Individual taxation of spouses has been introduced in a number of OECD countries, but 
not yet France.  Further to this, many policies are still designed with an implicit reference to 
male- breadwinner situation that are not any longer the norm.   
Policy makers should also be concerned with the possible poverty risk faced by households 
where women are the sole earner. When this type of situation arises from adverse 
circumstances that hit the husband rather than from a common decision, (low-educated) 
female breadwinners may not bring enough income home to satisfy the needs of their 
household.  If female breadwinnership situations have a negative impact on husbands' 
psychological well-being, which could be especially true for low-educated and/or more 
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to reduce  husbands' search intensity and work probability.  Policies targeted at publicizing 
the occurrence of female breadwinnership situations as "non-exceptional" cases may help turn 
down the stress from these couples.   
One may expect that the number of households where the wife is the sole or the main 
earner will continue to increase.  Education levels of women have been increasing in all 
OECD countries and this may contribute to reinforce this trend.  It is no longer possible for 
economists and policy makers to ignore the existence of women that are the sole or main 
breadwinner in the household.  The aim of this study is to shed more light on the determinants 
of situations where the wife is the sole or the main earner.  Do they reflect increased 
education levels of women and possibly narrowing gender wage gaps or rather a deterioration 
of employment and earnings of men? Pencavel (1998) relates the increasing education rates of 
American women to the increase in the number of dual-earners.   Positive assortative mating 
is bound to drive up dual activity rates, but does it have an impact on the occurrence of female 
breadwinnership and wife-higher-earning situations?  To our knowledge, none of these issues 
has been dealt with in the early literature on household behaviour or in the huge female labour 
supply literature.  Therefore, no attempt is made here to survey this literature1.  The structure 
of the paper is the following.  First, given the empirical stress of the study, the data are 
described.  Next to this, descriptive analysis of spouses’ characteristics and of a typology of 
households types, defined with respect to spouses’ labour market employment, is provided.  
Then, econometric models of the occurrence of, respectively, female breadwinners and wives-
higher-earnings are estimated, assuming, for simplification, a unitary decisionary framework 
at the household level.  The last section concludes the paper.  
 
2.  The data  
The sample for analysis is drawn from the French Labor Force Surveys (LFS) of years 
1990 to 2002. The LFS series was broken in 2003 to comply with harmonization requirements 
of the European statistical offices.  The new LFS are carried out on a continuous basis and the 
                                                           
1 The reader may look at Sofer (2004) for a review of the household literature and Donni and Moreau (2007) 
for an application of the collective model to French couples.  Stancanelli (2006) also provides a quick overview 
of some of the French literature.  
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unemployment are not comparable to the earlier surveys.   
 The LFS surveys up to 2002 were carried once a year, in March, and had a rotating sample 
structure which enables us to construct a longitudinal sample.  Around 60,000 households 
were interviewed each year in March, with a third of the sample being replaced each year. It 
follows that households stayed in the sample for at most three years.  All household members 
were interviewed. For our analysis, we first, select from each survey year, a sample of 
individuals with the following characteristics:  
a)  they reported to be either “household head” or spouse of the head; 
b)  they were aged between 16 and 65; 
c)  they were not doing their military service;  
d)  they were either formally married or living together. 
Next, records for husbands and wives were linked together using the household identifier.  
Observations for which either the “husband” or the “wife” were not in the survey were 
dropped from the sample. This leads to a sample of roughly 35,000 couples for each of the 
years considered.  Finally, observations relating to the different years were pooled together 
over time to construct the sample for analysis, which contains almost 471,000 couples.   We 
built in the data an indicator to track the same couple over time.  
The main features of this survey are common to most OECD LFS data.  Interviews are 
carried out by personal interview at the house of the respondents. Information on various 
items is therefore subjective and not drawn from administrative files.  The labour market 
status occupied at the time of carrying out the survey is asked and earnings refer to current 
gross monthly earnings.  Questions on earnings are only asked to dependent workers.  The 
earnings of the self-employed are not surveyed.  No information is collected on other 
household income.   
Educational level variables are increasing in education level, level 6 corresponding to at 
most compulsory education.  The basis for the education dummies is the highest level, equal 
to university or higher degrees.  We have information in the dataset on the socio-economic 
profession of individuals at two-digits and one-digit level of classification (see Annex to the 
paper).  This was available also for individuals currently out of work but that had some work 
experience in the past.  To proxy positive assortative mating we use three variables:  a dummy 
for whether spouses enjoy the same education level; a dummy for whether they belong to the 
same socio-economic profession; and a variable measuring their age difference.  We expect 
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interaction variable of same education level and low education level to capture the situation of 
spouses being both low-educated, as this variable may have an opposite impact on household 
labour market behaviour than for the case were spouses are both medium or high educated 
people.  
We have constructed a variable giving the number of dependent children living at home 
and a dummy for the presence of any small children of less than three years old in the 
household.  We draw the line at three years as children aged three to five are admitted into 
maternal school in France, which is free of charge and unconstrained, as it is available to all 
children.  Maternal schools open their doors at 8h15, or sometime earlier, and close at 18h00, 
or sometimes even later.  All children go to maternal school in France. 
Local labour market conditions are captured by the region of residence and the size of the 
area of residence dummies. Small cities include rural neighbourhoods or urban 
neighbourhoods with less than 20,000 inhabitants; large cities are those with more than 
200,000 inhabitants. Paris stands on its own.  The basis for these dummies are medium size 
cities with a population of 20,000 to 200,000 inhabitants.    
3.  Descriptive analysis of spouses characteristics and couples’ typology 
The main economic activities of the two spouses, within each couple, are compared in 
Tables 1a and 1b, respectively, for 1990 and 2002.  We see that the number of dual-earners 
has increased by 6% over the period considered: from 52% of the population of couples in 
1990 to 58% in 2002.  The proportion of couples where both spouses are unemployed has 
remained constant at about 0.6%, while couples of retirees and other inactive couples have 
slightly increased (+ 0.3 each).  
Next, we compare the educational levels of the two spouses in Tables 2a and 2b, 
respectively for 1990 and 2002.  About 47% of the partners had the same education level in 
1990, against 40% in 2002.  The proportion of couples where both spouses are low-educated 
has almost halved (going from 28% to 15%), while that of the highest educated spouses has 
doubled, rising from 3% to 6%.  This follows the trends in increasing education levels of the  
population.    
Positive assortative mating has slightly decreased according to the narrower definition (see 
Table 3) but it has remained unchanged, on a wider criterion.  Tables 4a and 4b compare the 
socio-economic professional classes of husbands and wives, respectively in 1990 and 2002.  
Endogamy of high-qualified professional (class 3) has increased the most, concerning almost 
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(handcrafters, shopkeepers and business owners) has, on the other hand, decreased.     
In Table 5, the gross monthly salaries of the two spouses in salaried dual-earners couples –
wage information is only available for salaried workers in the LFS- are compared by means of 
gender wage ratios computed for each couple.   To get a measure of the “negotiating power” 
of spouses we look at their gross monthly salaries, without adjusting for hours of work.  This 
has the additional advantage of being free from measurement error in hours (but not in 
salaries).  As salaries are also self-reported we discard from the analysis salaries 
corresponding to an hourly wage of less than half the minimum wage2. 
Let us now distinguish couple-households by their labour market participation as follows:  
•  Dual-earners, where both spouses are at work; 
•  Male-breadwinner couples, where he works but she does not; 
•  Female-breadwinner couples, where she works but he does not; 
•  Out-of-work couples, where both spouses are out of work.  
Here we draw the line at being employed, so that out-of-work situations include 
unemployment as well as inactivity.  While there is less concern with defining employment, 
the border line between inactivity and unemployment is sometimes harder to draw (see, for 
example, Jones and Riddel, 2006).  In particular, at times of high unemployment some 
individuals and especially (married) women may opt for defining themselves as “housewives” 
rather than unemployed.  Non-employment includes, in addition to unemployment and 
housework, also education, sickness, retirement or early retirement.   
We further split dual-earners into the following two categories, according to spouses’ 
earnings dominance:   
•   “Normal” dual-earners, where the husband earns more than his wife; 
•  Higher-earnings wives, where she earns the same or more income than he does. 
Earnings dominance is based here on actual current gross monthly earnings.  Hours of 
work and potential earnings are not considered.   
                                                           
2  Some people in the sample report hourly earnings below the minimum wage. Cross-checking 
observations with unusually low earnings against an indicator of unreliable survey responses provided in the 
survey, we could not find any correlation between the two.  We could not find any evidence that individuals 
reporting less than the hourly minimum wage were misreporting their wages.  Moreover, in France, in jobs like 
babysitting, workers may happen to earn less than the hourly minimum wage.  The standard contract for these 
household employees distinguishes between “active” and “passive” hours of work, where “active” hours of work 
amount to 2/3 of the actual working time and they are the ones actually paid for by the employers.  For these 
reasons, we have resolved to draw the line at half the hourly minimum wage and drop those observations earning 
less than this from our sample.   
  8 Descriptive statistics, respectively, for all couples, all dual-earners, wife-higher-earnings 
and male and female breadwinners are shown in Tables 6, 7 and 8.   These statistics are based 
on the pooled dataset going from 1990 to 2002 and they are not sample weighted3.  It appears 
that dual-earners spouses are on average two-years younger than the average in the sample of 
couples (Table 6).  They are also more likely to be higher educated -level 6 being the lowest, 
which corresponds to compulsory education- more likely to be French and to belong to the 
same socio-economic professional class.  Almost 18% of dual-earners spouses belong to the 
same socio-economic professional class while 13% of the couples sampled are in this 
situation- this on the basis of the two-digit classification of socio-economic occupations. 
Dual-earners are on average slightly less likely to have small children of less than three years.  
Spouses’ total income from work is larger on average for dual-earners couples than in the 
sample, but this does not take income taxation into account4.  Sample sizes are very large: we 
have 251,000 dual-earners in the thirteen years sample.    
If we look at dual-earners couples where she earns the same or more than him, we have 
35,000 couples (Table 7).  In these couples, wives are on average much more likely to be 
higher educated: 23% of women have high secondary school education against 14% of the 
pool of dual-earners wives and 10% of the sample.  Average education levels of men are 
comparable to those of any other dual-earners men.  But the husband in these couples earns 
just slightly more (less than 100 euros more, on a gross monthly basis) than the average wife 
in the sample does, while their “high-earnings” wives earn about as much as the average 
husband in the sample does!        
Table 8 provides descriptive statistics for couples where the husband is a breadwinner, i.e. 
he works and she does not, including cases when she is unemployed.  Wives in male-
breadwinner couples are on average much more likely to be low-educated women: 43% of 
them have at most compulsory education against 36% of wives in our sample and 25% of 
wives in dual-earners couples.  They are also less likely to be French: 87% of them are French 
against 91% for the sample and 95% among dual-earners couples.  A larger proportion of 
male-breadwinner couples have small children of less than three years than it is the case for 
dual-earners: 19% of them have pre-school children of less than 3 years old, against 12% of 
the sample and 10% of dual-earners couples.  They also have on average more children (1.7) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
3 Sample weighted descriptives are very close figures because of the large sample coverage.  
4 The system of taxation is very favourable to a sole-earner household in France.  
  9 than couples in the sample (1.3).  The two spouses are less likely to belong to the same socio-
professional class, which is to a certain extent explained by the fact that “permanently” out of 
work spouses will be classified among non-professionals.  The average earnings of husbands 
are not higher than the sample average.   
If we look next at couples where the wife is the breadwinner, a striking fact is that on 
average wives and husbands are much older that in the sample: her average age is 46 and his 
is 50, against, respectively, 41 and 53 for the sample.  The average age difference of spouses 
is also larger and equal to almost four years against over two years for the sample.  For the 
older couples, female breadwinnership is likely to have come out as the husband has retired or 
early-retired.  Wives are on average less educated than in the sample: 44% of them have at 
most the compulsory education level while the same figure is 36% for the sample.  The same 
applies to their husbands: 46% of them have at most compulsory education level while low-
educated men represent 33% of the sample for analysis.  This may be due to a composition 
effect:  female-breadwinnership is associated with older-age of spouses while education levels 
have been increasing over time so that older generation are less educated than younger ones. 
They are also less likely to have small children and any children in general, which also maybe 
due to composition effects.  Female-breadwinner couples are less likely to be married and 
slightly more likely to live in Paris than the average sample couple.  Women’s monthly gross 
salaries are in line with the sample average.   
The evolution of the different types of couples over time is given in Table 9.  Interestingly, 
the proportion of couples where she earns more than him increases from a mere 3% in 1990 to 
over 9% in 2002.  Male-breadwinner couples become less common, going from 30% of the 
sample in 1990 to 23% in 2002, while female-breadwinners go up slightly, from over 5% in 
1990 to over 7% in 2002.  Some of the female-breawinners situations may be the result of the 
husband having taken retirement, but restricting age to below 55 for both spouses does not 
affect substantially the occurrence of female breadwwiners, suggesting that husband’s 
retirement is not the sole reason for this.  On the other hand, we have no information in the 
LFS surveys on the health status of individuals, while it is well possible that some of these 
husbands are sick and/or affected by permanent incapacity.   
To get some idea of persistence in a given state, we look at transitions from one state to the 
other over time.  We look at transitions from 2000 to 2001 (and 1990 to 1991) in Table 10 and 
from 2000 to 2002 (and 1990 to 1992) in Table 11.   Matrices of transitions are conditional on 
attrition, as transitions can only be observed for couples that stay in the sample over, 
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keeps only one third of the observations in the sample for at most three years period, as a third 
of the observations is replaced each year.   In addition to this, some individuals may “choose” 
or simply “happen” not to participate into following interviews in spite of what are the survey 
designers “wishes”, because they have for example moved house in the meanwhile.  To the 
extent that “moving houses” or “refusing to participate into later survey interviews”  is related 
to labour market transitions this may bias the estimated transition rates.      
In 2000, “normal” dual-earners - where he earns more than she does- represented 49% of 
the sample. One year later, in 2001, 41% of couples were still “normal” dual-earners, while 
3%   had moved to the male-breadwinner model and another 3% to the wife-higher-earnings 
one (see Table 10).  Two years later, in 2002, 40% of couples were still dual-earners, 4% had 
moved to the male bread-winner state and over 3% to the wife-higher-earnings state.   
If we then take couples that were in the male-breadwinner state, these were 24% of all 
couples in 2000(see Table 10), 18% of all couples were still male-breadwinner one year later 
and 16% two years later (see Table 11), while, respectively 4 and 5% had moved to dual-
earners one and two years later.  As far as female-breadwinner couples, representing 7% of all 
couples in 2000, a total of 1% made a transition to the state of dual-earners and another 1% to 
that of both-out-of-work, while over 4% of all couples stayed on in “female-breadwinnership” 
over the period considered.   
Wife-higher-earnings couples are over 7% of the sample in 2000 and almost 9% in 2001 
and 2002.  About 2% of all couples move from higher-earnings-wife state to “normal” dual-
earners, while 3% of couples do the opposite transition.  
The least mobile state seems to be that where both spouses are out of work.  One might 
have liked to see more transitions out of this state.              
4.  An exploratory model of couples’ labour market states 
We assume a simple unitary framework under which husband and wife maximize one 
couples’ utility function and take joint decisions concerning their labour market states.  Their 
labour supply decisions depend on a combination of spouses’ characteristics and couples’ 
characteristics as well as on the state of the labour market.  The advantage of taking a simple 
unitary framework, ie assuming a single utility function for the couple, is that we do not have 
to model the complex negotiation process within the household.  An obstacle to specifying a 
more structural model is also the absence of any information on non-labour income in the 
data.  Besides, the neoclassical maximization set up tends to imply that different outcomes are 
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For example, a spouse may only work to make end meets and not out of “pure” choice; or 
vice versa a spouse maybe out of work while searching for a job.    Taking an exploratory 
reduced form approach, we do not impose any a priori on the data.  This allows us to specify a 
naïve model of spouses’ labour market situations.  We consider four possible combinations of 
labour market states of husband and wife:  
•  They both work: dual-earners (EE) 
•  Only the man works, the wife is out of work: male breadwinner couples (MB) 
•  Only the wife works, her husband  is out of work: female breadwinner couples (FB) 
•  They are both out of work (OO).  
The probability of observing a couple in a given combination of labour market states for 
husband and wife will be the outcome of a number of factors going from spouses’ joint 
decisions to the situation of the labour market and spouses’ and couple’s socio-economic 
characteristics.  To get some insights into the determinants of the (static) probability of 
occupying any of these states, we specify two sets of reduced form models.  First, we specify 
a multinomial logit model of the probability that a couple is found in one of the following 
labour market states:  
•  Dual-earners couples (EE) 
•  male breadwinner couples (MB) 
•  female breadwinner couples (FB) 
•  couples where both spouses are out of work (OO).  
The underlying hypothesis is that the probabilities of occupying any of these states are 
unordered and independent from each other.  Let the base for these probabilities be the 
occurrence of a dual-earners couple, which is the most common situation.  The model is 
specified as follows, having assumed that the errors follow a closed form logistic distribution:  
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FB MB FB OO
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Next to this, we specify a bivariate probit model of the probability that a couple is a dual-
earners couple and that she earns the same or more than he does.  As mentioned earlier, we 
concentrate on monthly earnings as information on hours is bound to be less reliable5.  The 
potential earnings of each spouse are exogenous and determined ex-ante.  This seems a valid 
assumption.  The probability that some wives earn more than their husbands will be 
determined by wives’ and husbands’ characteristics.  We assume that the matching of 
spouses, ie the process of marriage formation, is exogenous and determined ex-ante, as 
conventional in the literature on the labour market choices of spouses.       
3)   













where F is the probability of observing both spouses in-work at time t and A is the 
probability that she earns more or the same gross monthly salary than he does.  The vectors x 
and m contain here the same covariates.  We assume that the errors are normally distributed 
and allow for correlation, ξ, of the two equations as the same (unobserved or observed) 
spouses and couple’s characteristics may drive both relationships.    
Under this set up, the log-likelihood for observation i is the following:  
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We consider four sets of regressors:  
•  demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the wife; 
•  couples’ characteristics ;  
•  characteristics of the local labour market; 
                                                           
5 Descriptive analysis of hourly rates, suggests, however, that also on the basis of hourly wage rates, about a 
quarter of wives in dual-earners couples earn the same or more than their husbands.   
  13 •  year variation, to control for changes in the macroeconomic situation or possibly in 
the yearly surveys (though no major change took place in this sense, at least to our 
knowledge).  
The first set of variables attempts to control for the fact that the couple’s joint labour 
market participation has been found to follow closely wives’ behaviour, according to our 
preliminary descriptive analysis.  One could not control simultaneously for husband’s and 
wife’s variables given their likely strong correlation.  We control for age, birth cohort and 
educational level of the wife.  
Couple’s specific characteristics are dummies for the number of children and the presence 
of young pre-school children (three years in France6); the age difference between the two 
spouses (age of the husband minus that of the wife); a dummy for equal education level and 
the same interacted with low education level; a dummy for spouses belonging to the same 
socio-economic professional class7.  The variable measuring age differences is meant to 
capture some dimension of positive assortative mating, as proxied by closer age of the two 
spouses.  
We assume that marriage formation is exogenous to labour market participation, as 
standard in the economics literature. 
Results of estimation are given, respectively, in Table 12 and 13.  On the basis of the 
results of estimation of the multinomial logit model we find that the probability of occupying 
any state other than that of being a dual-earners couple decreases significantly with the age of 
the wife.  The cohort of women born just after second world war are less likely to be female-
breadwinners or part of a couple where both spouses are out of work.  Wives born between 
1955 and 1965 are significantly more likely to be found in a “both-out-of-work” couple than 
younger or older cohorts wives.  This corroborates other findings for France  that the baby-
boom generation of the 1960s faced more severe labour market problems.  Couples with 
lower-educated wives are much less likely to be dual-earners: low-educated wives increase 
significantly the probability of either MB or FB or OO states.  This negative effect is even 
stronger for couples where both spouses have low education levels.  
                                                           
6 Almost the totality of children of three years and older are enrolled in education in France.  Although this is not 
compulsory for children between 3 and 5 years, a place is guaranteed for parents that want to benefit from the 
system.  Most French children go to “ecole maternelle”, school, when they are three.     
7 Here it should be noticed that also unemployed people and those for whom no information was available on 
professional skills were given a socio-economic professional class, labelled “person without any profession”  
(see Annex).  About 30% of women and 4% of men were in this situation in 1990.  These figures are somewhat 
smaller for 2002.  The proportion of spouses belonging to the same socio-economic professional class and being 
in this situation is roughly 10% at both points in time.   
  14 Unmarried couples are less likely to occupy the MB state, relative to dual-earnership, 
which is very plausible.  The opposite holds true for FB and OO couples, that are significantly 
more likely to be not married, relative to dual-earners couples.    
MB, FB and OO couples are all less likely to live in the region of Paris than dual-earners, 
while they are more likely to live in large provincial towns.  This could reflect either 
mentality or differential unemployment rates, which are lower in the area of Paris.  
They are also less likely to be French, which would suggest either more difficulties to get 
integrated into the French labour market for non-French couples or a more traditional attitude 
to role sharing.       
The presence of small pre-school children increases the probability of MF, FB and OO, 
relative to that of being a dual-earners couple.  The probability of being a MF or an OO 
couple also increases with the number of children while that of being an MF couple decreases.   
Increasing age difference reduces the probability of being a dual-earner couple, and 
increases that of MB, FB, and OO.  Spouses enjoying the same education level –having 
isolated the effect of same-ed u c a t i o n - l o w -  a r e  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  M B ,  F B  o r  O O .   T h e s e  
findings suggest as we had expected that positive assortative mating, as measured by smaller 
age difference and same level of education, increases the probability of being dual-earners.  
Belonging to the same socio-occupational class is not included among the explanatory 
variables of the multinomial logit; given its construction this variable might be endogenous 
and, therefore, we exclude it (see earlier footnote). 
Finally, the time dummies suggest that the probability of MB decreases significantly 
overtime, while that of FB increases.  
Let us then look at the results of estimation of the bivariate probit model of being a dual-
earners couple and one where the wife earn the same or more than her husband.  We discuss 
the marginal estimates for positive outcomes of both probabilities: wives earning higher 
wages in dual-earners couples.  These estimates are given in Table 13.  We find that the 
higher-earnings-wife (HEW) probability increases significantly with the age of wives, but at a 
decreasing rate (negative age squared estimate).  Older cohorts wives are less likely to be 
higher-earnings ones.  So are low-educated wives: the probability of being a higher-earnings 
wife increases significantly with education (remember education level 6 is the lowest and the 
basis for these dummies is having completed a university degree or higher).  The likelihood of 
HEW increases for unmarried couples, by approximately 0.4% percentage points.  It also 
increases with the presence of small pre-school children, by 0.2  percentage points, but it falls 
  15 with the number of children.  The causal nature of the variable “small pre-school children” 
may actually be questioned.  It is more likely that HEW occurs first and that labour market 
attachment is stronger for HEW.  The same could apply to FB in the earlier model.  
Being of French nationality increases the probability of HEW.  It might be that non-French 
wives are having a harder time making a career or it could be that they are just overly less-
educated relative to French women8.  There might also be cultural factors at stake.    
Living in the region of Paris does not affect the likelihood of HEW, while living in large 
provincial towns reduces it significantly.  
Finally, coming to the positive assortative mating variables, we find that larger age 
difference reduces significantly the HEW probability.  Spouses enjoying the same education 
level have lower chances of HEW, except for the case of spouses being both low-educated, 
that are significantly more likely to be HEW.   So the probability of HEW is higher for higher 
educated wives only when the husband does not have the same education level.  On the other 
hand, if we look at descriptive statistics from Table 2, both spouses in HEW couples tend to 
be more educated than the sample average.  Moreover, belonging to the same professional 
class increases significantly the probability of HEW, by 0.8 percentage points.   
 
Conclusions  
This paper investigates the labour market states occupied by spouses and their 
determinants.  There is huge economic literature on lone parents but, to our knowledge, no 
economic paper deals with the situation of female breadwinners in couple households.  This 
issue is relevant for policy purposes.  First of all, it is on the agenda of all OECD governments 
to increase participation rates of (married) women and some lessons could be learned from the 
case of female breadwinners.  Second, obstacles to the labour supply of secondary earners 
may have to be removed, in order to foster the labour supply of men married to a female 
breadwinner. Thirdly, some female-breadwinner households may be exposed to the risk of 
poverty like most lone parents are.   And finally, it is crucial for the well-being of men and 
women in “female-breadwinner” households that their existence is acknowledged by society 
as a whole.  
The data used for the analysis are drawn from the French labour force surveys of 1990 to 
2002.  We find that in one every six couple-households the wife was the sole or the main 
                                                           
8 We have found that for a larger proportion of non-French respondents education was either very low or non-
coded.  
  16 earner in France in year 2002.  The number of dual-earners has gone up from 52% of the 
population in 1990 to 58% in 2002.  About a fifth of women in dual-earners couples in our 
sample earn a higher gross monthly salary than their husbands. The proportion of male 
breadwinners couples has diminished steadily overtime, from 30% in 1990 to 22% in 2002; 
while that of female breadwinners has increased from 5% to 7%.
We have assumed a simplified unitary framework, which allows us to carry out some 
straightforward exploratory econometric analysis of the different states occupied by spouses, 
without imposing any a priori constraints on the data.  We have thus distinguished the 
occurrence of dual-earners, from male and female breadwinners’ couples and couples where 
both spouses are out of work.  We have controlled for variables relating to the 
macroeconomic and local labour market situation, for demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of the wife, as well as for couple’s specific characteristics, ranging from the 
presence and age of children to various indicators of positive assortative mating of spouses.  
Our findings confirm the importance of this last set of regressors to explain joint labour 
behaviour of the two spouses.   
Finally, sticking to the unitary framework, we have estimated models of the probability of 
observing a dual-earners couple and one where the wife earns the same or more than her 
husband.  We assume to this end that spouses’ potential earnings are independent and 
exogenously determined and that couple’s formation is ex-ante determined, as conventional in 
the literature. We find that the higher-earnings-wife (HEW) probability increases significantly 
with education and it is stronger for unmarried couples.  The probability of HEW is higher for 
higher educated wives only when the husband does not have the same education level. 
Belonging to the same professional class increases significantly the probability of HEW, by 
0.8 percentage points.   However, low-educated women married to low-educated men also 
show higher probabilities of earning more than their husband, suggesting that higher-earnings 
wives can be found at the two extremes of the distribution of education levels of couples: 
among both high-educated and low-educated couples.  This might indicate that higher-
earnings wives are not just the result of emancipation but possibly also reflect some 
deterioration of earnings and employment of low-educated men relative to those of low-
educated women.   Future research will have to look further into these issues.   
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  18 Appendix: definition of socio-economic professional class, according to the 
original French question. 
  
The list below gives the socio-economic and professional category of individuals, according to the 
narrower definition, at two digits level.  The broader classification, at one digit level, is given in 
brackets.  
 
•  Agriculteurs sur petite exploitation (classe 1) 
•  Agriculteurs sur moyenne exploitation (classe 1) 
•  Agriculteurs sur grande exploitation (classe 1) 
•  Artisans (classe 2) 
•  Commerçants et assimilés(classe 2) 
•  Chefs d'entreprise de 10 salariés ou plus (classe 2) 
•  Professions libérales  (classe 3) 
•  Cadres de la fonction publique   (classe 3) 
•  Professeurs, professions scientifiques  (classe 3) 
•  Professions de l'information, des arts et des spectacles  (classe 3) 
•  Cadres administratifs et commerciaux d'entreprises   (classe 3) 
•  Ingénieurs et cadres techniques d'entreprises   (classe 3) 
•  Instituteurs et assimilés  (classe 4) 
•  Professions intermédiaires de la santé et du travail social  (classe 4) 
•  Clergé, religieux  (classe 4) 
•  Professions intermédiaires administratives de la fonction publique  (classe 4) 
•  Professions intermédiaires administratives et commerciales des entreprises (classe 4) 
•  Techniciens  (classe 4) 
•  Contremaîtres, agents de maîtrise  (classe 4) 
•  Employés civils et agents de service de la fonction publique  (classe 5) 
•  Policiers et militaires  (classe 5) 
•  Employés administratifs d'entreprises   (classe 5) 
•  Employés de commerce   (classe 5) 
•  Personnels des services directs aux particuliers   (classe 5) 
•  Ouvriers qualifiés de type industriel   (classe 6) 
•  Ouvriers qualifiés de type artisanal (classe 6) 
•  Chauffeurs  (classe 6) 
•  Ouvriers qualifiés de la manutention, du magasinage et du transport  (classe 6) 
•  Ouvriers non qualifiés de type industriel  (classe 6) 
•  Ouvriers non qualifiés de type artisanal  (classe 6) 
•  Ouvriers agricoles (classe 6) 
•  Anciens agriculteurs exploitants  (classe 7) 
•  Anciens artisans, commerçants, chefs d'entreprise (classe 7) 
•  Anciens cadres  (classe 7) 
•  Anciennes professions intermédiaires (classe 7) 
•  Anciens employés  (classe 7) 
•  Anciens ouvriers (classe 7) 
•  Chômeurs n'ayant jamais travaillé (classe8) 
•  Militaires du contingent (classe8) 
•  Élèves, étudiants (classe8) 
•  Personnes diverses sans activité professionnelle de moins de 60 ans (sauf retraités) (classe8) 
•  Personnes diverses sans activité professionnelle de 60 ans et plus (sauf retraités) (classe8) 
  19 Table 1a : Economic activity of husband and wife, year 1990: percentages. 
   Husbands            





Retired   Other 
inactive 
Sum 
Employed   51.7  1.4 0.2  0.2  2.4  1.3  57.3 
Unemployed 4.9  0.6  0.05 0.03  0.3  0.2  6.0 
Other 
unemployed ILO 
0.6 0.03  0.03  0.01 0.01  0.02  0.7 
Full-time 
Education 
0.6 0.03  0.01  0.15  0.0 
 
0.02  0.8 
Retired 0.8  0.05 0.0 0.0  2.7  0.2  3.7 
Other inactive  23.3  1.2 
 
0.1 0.04  5.4  1.4  31.5 
Sum 
(observations) 
81.9 3.3  0.5  0.4  10.7  3.1  100 
(34973) 
Note :  Sample weighted statistics.  
 
 
Table 1b : Economic activity of husband and wife, year 2002: percentages. 
   Husbands            





Retired   Other 
inactive 
Sum 
Employed   57.8  1.9 0.3  0.3  3.0  2.0  65.3 
Unemployed 4.0  0.6  0.07 0.05  0.2  0.3  5.3 
Other 
unemployed ILO 
0.6 0.04  0.04  0.0 0.02  0.02  0.8 
Full-time 
Education 
0.8 0.06  0.01  0.2  0.0 0.03  1.1 
Retired 1.0  0.02 0.0 0.0  3.0  0.2  4.2 
Other inactive  16.6  1.3  0.1  0.08  3.5  1.7  23.3 
Sum 
(observations) 
81.0 3.9  0.6  0.6  9.6  4.3  100 
(34828) 
Note :  Sample weighted statistics.  
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Table 2a : Education levels of husband and wife, year 1990, % 
  Men        
Wives  Level 1 
(the 
highest) 




3.3  0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.2 5.1 
Level 2  2.1  1.8  1.4 1.7 0.5 0.7 8.2 
Level 3  1.6 1.1  2.3  3.3 0.9 1.6 10.8 
Level 4  0.8  0.9  2.3  10.2  1.6 6.5 22.4 
Level 5  0.5  0.4  1.4  3.0  1.3  2.6  9.2 
Level 6  0.5  0.6  1.8  11.6  1.9  27.8  44.2 
Sum 
(observations) 
8.8  5.6  9.7  30.1 6.4  39.4 100 
(34270) 




Table 2b : Education levels of husband and wife, year 2002, % 
 Husbands             
Wives  Level 1 
(the 
highest) 




6.2  1.7 1.3 1.1 0.4 0.4 11.0 
Level 2  3.0  3.3  2.3 2.9 0.9 1.0 13.4 
Level 3  1.6 1.9  3.2  5.0 1.1 1.9 14.7 
Level 4  0.8  1.6  2.7  12.0  1.7 5.7 24.6 
Level 5  0.4  0.6  1.1  3.3  1.0  2.2  8.6 
Level 6  0.4  0.6  1.4  9.1  1.5  14.7  27.7 
Sum 
(observations) 
12.5 9.7 12.0  33.3  6.6 25.9  100 
(34826) 
Note :  Sample weighted statistics. 
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Table 3 :  Trends in positive assortative mating  
 
  Same education level  Same socio-economic 
professional class (at two 
digits level) 
Same socio-economic 
professional class (at one 
digit level) 
  Mean (standard error)  Mean (standard error)  Mean (standard error) 
1990  0.47  (0.50)  0.14  (0.35)  0.23  (0.42) 
1991  0.47  (0.50)  0.14  (0.34)  0.22  (0.41) 
1992  0.45  (0.50)  0.13  (0.34)  0.22  (0.42) 
1993  0.45  (0.50)  0.13  (0.34)  0.22  (0.41) 
1994  0.44  (0.50)  0.13  (0.34)  0.22  (0.41) 
1995  0.44  (0.50)  0.13  (0.33)  0.22  (0.41) 
1996  0.43  (0.50)  0.12  (0.33)  0.21  (0.41) 
1997  0.42  (0.49)  0.12  (0.33)  0.21  (0.41) 
1998  0.41  (0.49)  0.12  (0.33)  0.22  (0.41) 
1999  0.41  (0.49)  0.13  (0.33)  0.22  (0.41) 
2000  0.41  (0.49)  0.12  (0.33)  0.22  (0.41) 
2001  0.41  (0.49)  0.12  (0.33)  0.22  (0.42) 
2002  0.40  (0.49)  0.12  (0.33)  0.22  (0.42) 
Note :  Sample weighted statistics. 
 
  22 Table 4a: Socio-economic professional classes of husbands and wives, year 1990: percentages 
  H u s b a n d s         
Wives  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Sum 
1  2.7         0.1         0.02         0.05         0.03  0.2         0.3         0.04  3.4 
2  0.1         3.1          0.3            0.4         0.2  0.5         0.1         0.1  4.8 
3   0.03         0.3         3.0         0.8         0.2  0.2         0.1         0.1  4.7 
4  0.3         0.9         3.1         4.7         1.3   2.0         0.2         0.3  12.8 
5  0.5         2.5         2.7         7.4         4.9  13.0          0.5         0.9  32.5 
6  0.1         0.5         0.2         1.3         0.8  6.6         0.1         0.3  10.1 
7  0.05         0.1         0.1         0.05         0.03  0.1         0.8         0.03  1.2 
8   0.8         2.4         4.4         5.0         2.9  12.0         1.3         1.6  30.5 
Sum  4.7         9.9        13.9        19.7        10.3  34.6         3.5         3.3  100 
(31282) 
Note :  Sample weighted statistics. 
 
 
Table 4b: Socio-economic professional classes of husbands and wives, year 2002: percentages 
  H u s b a n d s           
Wives  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Sum 
1  1.2  0.04 0.0  0.05 0.03 0.1  0.1  0.02 1.5 
2  0.04         1.7      0.2        0.4        0.1  0.4        0.09         0.1  3.1 
3  0.08         0.5          4.8         1.6        0.4   0.5         0.2        0.2   8.3 
4  0.3           0.9         4.1          5.2         1.7   3.0         0.4         0.4  16.1 
5  0.6         2.6         3.5          7.7         5.5  14.8         0.6         1.4  36.8 
6  0.2         0.3         0.2         1.2         0.7   5.7         0.1         0.5  9.1 
7   0.03         0.04         0.3         0.1         0.02  0.1         0.9         0.05   1.5 
8  0.3         1.7          3.7         3.3         2.2  9.3          1.2         1.9  23.6 
Sum    2.8         7.9        16.8        19.5        10.7  33.9            3.7         4.7  100 
(31972) 
Note :  Sample weighted statistics. 
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Table 5: Distribution of the ratio of the wife’s gross monthly salary over the husband’s gross monthly salary, for 












1991  0.36         0.56       0.77               0.98         1.16            8962 
1992  0.35         0.54       0.76               0.98          1.16         9818 
1993  0.34         0.53       0.76               .97         1.18         11166 
1994  0.34         0.53    0.76               0.98         1.18         11690 
1995  0.33         0.53        0.76               0.98               1.19         11625 
1996  0.33         0.52          0.75             0.99               1.21            12662 
1997    0.33         0.52      0.76               1           1.21           11207 
1998 0.33  0.53  0.77 
 
1 1.23  11196 
1999     0.34           0.54             0.77               1         1.22         10967 
2000  0.34         0.54                0.77           1         1.22         11132 
2001  0.35         0.54       0.76               1         1.22         12543 
2002  0.35         0.53                0.76             1  1.21           12812 
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Table 6.   Descriptive statistics  : sample and dual-earners. 
    Sample of husbands and wives  Dual-earners spouses   
Explanatory variables    Mean   
Standard 
deviation  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Age of the woman    41.528 11.053 39.337  9.137 
Age of the man  43.913 11.146 41.410  9.273 
Wife Cohort 1955-1965  0.310 0.462 0.351 0.477 
Wife cohort 1945-1954  0.292 0.455 0.319 0.466 
Wife cohort born before  
1944  0.167 0.373 0.092 0.290 
Education level 6, woman  0.363 0.481 0.249 0.433 
Education level 5, woman  0.087 0.282 0.090 0.286 
Education level 4, woman  0.246 0.430 0.272 0.445 
Education level 3, woman  0.123 0.328 0.147 0.354 
Education level 2, woman  0.107 0.309 0.143 0.350 
Education level 6, man  0.327 0.469 0.245 0.430 
Education level 5, man  0.062 0.241 0.066 0.249 
Education level 4, man  0.333 0.471 0.368 0.482 
Education level 3, man  0.102 0.303 0.115 0.319 
Education level 2, man  0.075 0.264 0.092 0.289 
Not married living together  0.166 0.372 0.184 0.387 
Any child  <3 years   0.120 0.325 0.107 0.310 
Children number  1.324 1.229 1.307 1.043 
French nationality    0.913 0.282 0.946 0.226 
Region of Paris    0.160 0.367 0.176 0.381 
Small neighborhood    0.471 0.450 0.483 0.450 
Large neighborhood  0.192 0.394 0.179 0.385 
Age difference   2.385 4.400 2.073 4.032 
Same education level  0.432 0.495 0.395 0.489 
Same education level * 
level 6 (low)  0.210 0.407 0.123 0.329 
Same class at 2 digits   0.129 0.335 0.177 0.382 
Monthly gross wage woman  6981.528 6715.453 7050.639 6619.977 
Monthly gross wage, man  9686.316 8026.423 9697.594 7267.985 
Couple’ s income from work  13771.84 10643.2  15923.3 10665.13 
Observations   470996    251106  
Note : Unweighted sample statistics for the period 1990-2002.  Wages are given in deflated French 
francs; they are averaged over positive values only; to transform into euros, must divide by 6.55957.  
Total income from work is given by the sum of wages of working spouses.   
 
 
  25 Table 7.   Descriptive statistics : the case of higher earnings wives  
Dual-earners couples where  the wife earns the same or more than her husband  
      
Explanatory variables    Mean   
Standard 
deviation    
Age of the woman    38.277 8.932     
Age of the man  39.667 9.263     
Wife Cohort 1955-1965  0.353 0.478     
Wife cohort 1945-1954  0.289 0.453     
Wife cohort born before  
1944  0.067 0.250     
Education level 6, woman  0.135 0.342     
Education level 5, woman  0.077 0.250     
Education level 4, woman  0.236 0.425     
Education level 3, woman  0.171 0.376     
Education level 2, woman  0.231 0.421     
Education level 6, man  0.249 0.433     
Education level 5, man  0.071 0.258     
Education level 4, man  0.373 0.484     
Education level 3, man  0.117 0.322     
Education level 2, man  0.097 0.296     
Not married living together  0.249 0.432     
Any child  <3 years   0.128 0.334     
Children number  1.160 0.984     
French nationality    0.958 0.200     
Region of Paris    0.206 0.405     
Small neighborhood    0.424 0.494     
Large neighborhood  0.194 0.396     
Age difference   1.390 4.046     
Same education level  0.356 0.479     
Same education level * 
level 6 (low)  0.077 0.267     
Same class at 2 digits   0.174 0.379     
Monthly gross wage woman  9690.62 10426.7     
Monthly gross wage man  7654.036 3239.664     
Couple’ s income from work  17344.66 12106.07     
Observations   34560      
Note : unweighted sample statistics  for the period 1990-2002. 
 
  26 Table 8.   Descriptive statistics    Couples mono-employed 
    Male breadwinner couples  Female breadwinner couples
Explanatory variables    Mean   
Standard 
deviation  Mean  
Standard 
deviation 
Age of the woman    39.485 10.486 46.276 11.378 
Age of the man  41.905 10.039 50.068 12.415 
Wife Cohort 1955-1965  0.326 0.468 0.191 0.393 
Wife cohort 1945-1954  0.275 0.447 0.302 0.459 
Wife cohort born before  
1944  0.134 0.341 0.343 0.475 
Education level 6, woman  0.430 0.495 0.444 0.497 
Education level 5, woman  0.092 0.288 0.087 0.282 
Education level 4, woman  0.242 0.428 0.219 0.413 
Education level 3, woman  0.111 0.314 0.096 0.294 
Education level 2, woman  0.072 0.259 0.091 0.288 
Education level 6, man  0.339 0.473 0.463 0.499 
Education level 5, man  0.061 0.239 0.059 0.236 
Education level 4, man  0.326 0.469 0.277 0.447 
Education level 3, man  0.096 0.294 0.085 0.279 
Education level 2, man  0.066 0.249 0.052 0.223 
Not married living together  0.153 0.360 0.182 0.386 
Any child  <3 years   0.190 0.392 0.056 0.230 
Children number  1.173 1.385 0.839 1.063 
French nationality    0.871 0.336 0.906 0.291 
Region of Paris    0.147 0.354 0.178 0.382 
Small neighborhood    0.459 0.498 0.442 0.497 
Large neighborhood  0.205 0.404 0.200 0.400 
Age difference   2.503 4.523 3.792 5.089 
Same education level  0.430 0.495 0.472 0.499 
Same education level * 
level 6 (low)  0.236 0.425 0.306 0.461 
Same class at 2 digits   0.015 0.124 0.030 0.171 
Monthly gross wage woman     6479.779  7428.885 
Monthly gross wage man  9675.064 9341.608     
Couple’ s income from work  9675.064 9341.608 6479.779 7428.885 
Observations   125510    32351  
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Table 9:  Trends in couples’ situation on the labour market  
 
  Normal dual-
earners 
She earns >= 





Both out of 
work 
1990  47.88 (48.34)   3.28 (3.37)  30.45 (30.22)  5.58 (5.56)  12.81 (12.51) 
1991  45.69 6.06  29.27 5.83  13.16 
1992  45.29 6.39  28.81 6.08  13.43 
1993  44.62 6.93  27.82 7.03  13.60 
1994  43.90 7.13  27.52 7.52  13.92 
1995  45.17 7.35  26.69 7.17  13.62 
1996  44.60 8.25  26.66 7.28  13.21 
1997  44.88 7.77  26.58 7.35  13.42 
1998  45.68 7.89  25.95 7.30  13.19 
1999  46.44 7.81  25.44 7.44  12.87 
2000  47.88 7.00  24.66 7.00  12.50 
2001  48.18 8.95  24.01 6.78  12.09 
2002  48.22 (48.38)  9.27 (9.46)  23.23 (23.23)  7.44 (7.50)  11.83 (11.52) 
Note: unweighted sample statistics.  Sample weighted statistics are given in brackets.  
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Both out of 
work 
She earns >= 




41.25 (40.21)  3.41 (3.53)  1.21 (1.72)  0.33 (0.43)  2.91 (3.62)  49.10 (49.51) 
Male 
Breadwinner,  
4.11 (4.15)  18.45 (23.72)  0.19 (0.19)  1.42 (1.84)  0.26 (0.16)  24.43 (30.06) 
Female 
breadwinner 
0.89 (0.87)  0.17 (0.14)  4.73 (3.45)  0.76 (0.66)  0.46 (0.18)  7.01 (5.30) 
Both out of 
work 
0.18 (0.18)  0.97 (0.69)  0.36 (0.33)  9.95 (10.59)  0.07 (0.04)  11.53 (11.83) 
She earns >= 
than he does 
1.99 (1.31)  0.29 (0.09)  0.36 (0.12)  0.05 (0.01)  5.24 (1.77)  7.93  (3.30) 
Total   48.43 (46.72)  23.28 (28.17)  6.85 (5.80)  12.50 (13.53)  8.94 (5.78)  100 (100) 
Number of 
observations 
9578 (9016)  4605 (5436)  1355 (1118)  2472 (2611)  1768 (1115)  1768 (1115) 
These are sample weighted statistics.  Transitions from 1990 to 1991 are given in brackets. Percentages shown 
are cell percentages. 
 
 
Table 11:  Transition matrices :  transitions over two years, from 2000 to 2002 (1990 to 1992).  
 








Both out of 
work 
She earns >= 




40.24 (38.90)  4.24 (4.58)  1.85 (2.74)  0.57 (0.88)  3.40 (3.83)  50.29 (50.93) 
Male 
Breadwinner,  
5.23 (5.19)  16.57 (21.26)  0.41 (0.28)  2.59 (2.93)  0.37 (0.12)  25.16 (29.77) 
Female 
breadwinner 
1.08 (0.93)  0.23 (0.17)  4.23 (2.72)  1.09 (0.98)  0.37 (0.23)  7.00 (5.04) 
Both out of 
work 
0.29 (0.29)  0.82 (0.76)  0.41 (0.25)  8.53 (9.43)  0.04 (0.05)  10.10 (10.78) 
She earns >= 
than he does 
1.95 (1.24)  0.47 (0.14)  0.50 (0.20)  0.04 (0.04)  4.50 (1.86)  7.46 (3.47)  
Total   48.79 (46.55)  22.33 (23.28)  7.39 (6.85)  12.81 (12.50)  8.67 (8.94)  100 (100) 
Number of 
observations 
4113 (3906)  1882 (2257)  623 (519)  1080 (1196)  731 (511)  4113 (3906) 
These are sample weighted statistics.  Transitions from 1990 to 1991 are given in brackets.  Percentages shown 
are cell percentages.  
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breadwinner  Out-work spouses 
Age of the wife  -0.352**(0.004) -0.306**(0.007)  -0.742**(0.007) 
Age of the wife squared  0.004**(0.00005) 0.005**(0.00008) 0.010**(0.00007) 
Wife Cohort 1955-1965  -0.010 (0.016)  0.016(0.034)  0.098**(0.033) 
Wife cohort 1945-1954  0.013 (0.026)  -0.167**(0.050)  -0.334**(0.050) 
Wife  born before  1944  0.224 (0.038)  0.016 (0.066)  -0.087(0.064) 
Education level 6  0.967**(0.018) 0.206**  (0.032) 1.352**(0.037) 
Education level 5  0.584**(0.019) 0.201  (0.033) 0.843**(0.039) 
Education level 4  0.478**(0.016) 0.182**  (0.028) 0.725**(0.035) 
Education level 3  0.276**(0.018) -0.085**  (0.032) 0.455**(0.038) 
Education level 2  -0.122**(0.019) -0.046  (0.032) 0.024**(0.042) 
Not married   -0.043**(0.011) 0.649**(0.019)  0.669**(0.020) 
Any child  <3 years   0.512**(0.011) 0.109**(0.028) 0.524**(0.023) 
Children number  0.423**(0.004) -0.050**(0.007) 0.355**(0.006) 
French nationality  -0.651**(0.014) -0.466**(0.024) -0.974**(0.020) 
Region of Paris  -0.329**(0.012) -0.063**(0.020) -0.672**(0.021) 
Small neighborhood  -0.179**(0.009) -0.243**  (0.016) -0.318**(0.016) 
Large neighborhood  0.047**(0.011) 0.108**  (0.020) 0.152**(0.018) 
Age difference   0.010**(0.0009) 0.114**(0.001)  0.126**(0.001) 
Same education level  -0.105**(0.010) -0.248**(0.019) -0.092**(0.020) 
Same educ. level * level 6  0.107**(0.016) 0.756**(0.029) 0.542**(0.027) 
Same class at 2 digits      
Year   -0.010**(0.001) 0.006**(0.002)  0.002  (0.002) 
Constant  5.513**(0;086) 2.032**(0.144)   
446330  Observat ions  
0.1601  Pseudo R2 
Likelihood ratio  
(χ2, 63) 
156853.23 
Note:  A  **  stands for significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 13.  Results of estimation of the bivariate probit model of 
observing a dual-earner couple and that she earns>+ than he does 
    Marginal effects  (dF/dx) 
Explanatory variables     coefficient   standard error 
Age of the wife    0.019** 0.001 
Age of the wife squared  -0.0002** 0.0002 
Wife Cohort 1955-1965  -0.001 0.005 
Wife cohort 1945-1954  -0.014* 0.008 
Wife cohort born before  
1944  -0.023** 0.011 
Education level 6  -0.227** 0.003 
Education level 5  -0.129** 0.004 
Education level 4  -0.125** 0.003 
Education level 3  -0.085** 0.004 
Education level 2  -0.004 0.004 
Not married   0.037** 0.003 
Any child  <3 years   0.018** 0.004 
Children number  -0.031** 0.001 
French nationality    0.033** 0  .005 
Region of Paris    0.003 0.003 
Small neighborhood    0.003 0.003 
Large neighborhood  -0.019** 0.003 
Age difference   -0.008** 0.0003 
Same education level  -0.051** 0.003 
Same educ. level * level 6  0.132** 0.007 
Same class at 2 digits   0.079** 0.004 
Year   -0.001** 0.0005 
Rho  0.009 0.023 
Observations   139056   
Wald ((χ2, 44)  7873.95   
Log Likelihood   -76568.061   
Marginal effects are computed for the case where both outcomes are positive. 
**  stands for significance at the 5% level; *  stands for significance at the 
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